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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
17663 
ROY HUTCHISON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with forcible sodomy, a second 
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953), as 
amended, for an act involving the genitals of SCOTT HARRIS 
and the mouth of appellant, without the consent of SCOTT HARRIS. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on January 19, 1981, in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, before the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, sitting without a jury. 
Appellant was convicted of the above charge and sentenced to 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction in the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
About 2:10 on the morning of October 18, 1980, Scott 
Harris, age sixteen, arrived at the Provo, Utah, Trailways 
bus station, en route from visiting his parents in Price, Utah, 
to a boys' ranch near Provo where he was living. He planned 
to wait at the station for transportation from Provo to the 
ranch (Tr. 16-17). Appellant, Roy Hutchison, was also at the 
station. Two Provo policemen, on a routine burglary check, 
saw both appellant and Scott Harris there early that morning 
(Tr. 8-9). 
After the policemen left, appellant and Harris 
engaged in trivial conversation, and appellant, learning that 
Harris had no place to spend the night, invited Harris to his 
apartment a short distance away (Tr, 19, 73). 
At the apartment, appellant continued the drinking 
he had begun earlier and gave Harris four or five drinks of 
Whiskey and Pepsi (Tr, 71-72, 19-20). When Harris began to 
~eel ~he effects of the alcohol, he told appellant he needed 
to lie down, and appellant directed him to the bedroom (Tr. 
20, 35). Just before he went into the bedroom, Harris saw 
that appellant had put on a woman's dress and wiq (Tr. 
-2-
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Harris fell unconscious on the bed but was awakened 
a short time later bv aopellant's tugging at his belt. 
Appellant was still wearing women's clothes. (Tr. 20-21). 
Though he tried unsuccessfully to get up, and to push appellant 
off, Harris was too weak to do either and again passed out on 
the bed (Tr. 22). 
The next thing Harris remembers is waking up with 
appellant's mouth on his penis (Tr. 22). Harris's pants had 
been pulled down to his knees (Tr. 31-32). He tried to resist 
by kicking, squirming, and hitting (Tr. 22, 34) , but he 
testified that "it felt as though my arms were made of lead" 
(Tr. 22). When he finally managed to get away, he ran out 
the door and onto the lawn (Tr. 23). 
At about 5:00 that morning, Jeff Suffern, who lived 
in the area, drove past appellant's apartment to go deer 
hunting. He saw Harris lying naked "in smoke and fire" in 
front of appellant's apartment (Tr. 12-13, 40, 71). When 
Suffern came to help, he found the boy "cold, burnt, and 
presumably in shock" (Tr. 13) near a pile of burning clothes. 
Harris was wearing only a boot, which had been burned (Tr. 
14). Suffern removed the boot, covered HarriS·'With his coat, 
and called the police. 
Robert Smith, a Provo policeman who answered Suffern's 
-3-
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call, also found Harris apparently in shock. Though Smith 
spoke with Harris at the scene and also later at the hospital, 
Harris "wasn't able to respond too well" (Tr. 41) , and also 
appeared to be still under the influence of alcohol (Tr. 42). 
Officer Smith's report, which appellant attempted to submit 
as evidence at the trial, was made from Smith's notes of these 
two conversations with Harris at the scene and at the hospital 
(Tr. 46-47). Though the police report apparently indicated 
that Harris responded affirmatively when asked if appellant 
had attempted anal intercourse with him (App. Brief, p. 3), 
even at trial Harris did not have a clear understanding of t~ 
terms anal intercourse and fellatio, and had probably never 
heard either term before this incident (Tr. 30-31). Appellant 
attempted to introduce the police report to impeach Harris's 
credibility, but the trial court excluded it as a violation 
of the hearsay evidence rule. The trial court found that 
appellant had the requisite intent to commit the crime and 
found Scott Harris "quite a credible witness under heated ~d 
extensive cross-examination" (Tr. 77). Appellant was convicted 
as charged. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE 
POLICE REPORT BECAUSE OF ITS UNRELIABILITY. 
A. 
THE POLICE REPORT IS UNRELIABLE BECAUSE 
IT IS HEARSAY, AND THEREFORE IS NOT AD-
MISSIBLE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE. 
In an attempt to impeach the credibility of Scott 
Harris, the prosecuting witness, appellant endeavored at trial 
to introduce as evidence a report prepared by Provo police 
Officer Robert H. Smith. The report was compiled from notes 
Officer Smith took of two conversations with Harris, one 
conversation at the scene of the incident, on appellant's 
front lawn, and the other at the hospital where the witness 
was taken for treatment (Tr. 46-47). Since the police report 
~as an after-the-fact account of conversations between Smith 
and Harris, it qualifies as hearsay ("a statement which is made 
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing"). 
Uta~ Rules of Evidence 63. 
Hearsay has historically been categorized as inadmis-
sible because it is unreliable. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 
§§ 1362-34 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); 29 Am.Jur. 22, Evidence, 
§ 493. Although appellant in his brief asserts that the report 
was prepared October 18, 1980, the day of the assault (Brief 
of Appellant, at 3), the transcript only indicates that the 
-5-
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conversations took place on that date, not that the report 
was prepared then (Tr. 46). It is logical to assume that 
any lapse in time between the conversation and the reporting 
of it would affect the reliability of the report. 
Appellant suggests that police reports generally 
are admissible as substantive evidence, to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted (Brief of appellant, at 3-4). 
However, just because a document is a police report does 
not make it immune from hearsay and other reliability 
requirements. Appellant himself concedes that the report 
still must meet the primary prerequisite of trustworthiness. 
See State v. McGeary, 322 A.2d 830 (N.J. 1974). The general 
rule for gauging a document's trustworthiness has been 
articulated as follows: 
[A]n official document, to be 
admissible, must state facts within 
the personal knowledge and observation 
of the recording official or his sub-
ordinates ... Onlv those official documents 
are admissible which are based solelv on 
the personal knowledge of the official who 
prepared them. 
State ex rel. Blankenship v. Freeman, 440 P. 2d 744 (Oi;.la. 1%8: 
(emphasis added). The matter asserted in the police report 
here, that Hutchison committed anal intercourse, not fellatio, 
on Harris, is not something "within the personal knowledge and 
observation of the recording official." Officer Smith arrived 
some hours after the act occurred; his report of the actual 
-6- j 
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incident could not be based on his own observation. 
Moreover, admission of the report to prove "the truth 
of the matter asserted" would not have aidi::;d appellant's 
case. Its admission would have been proof of anal 
intercouse, which is merely a different type of forcible 
sodomy. The report therefore lacks the necessary reliability 
to be admissible as substantive evidence of the supposed act 
of anal intercourse. 
B 
THE POLICE REPORT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER ANY OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE. 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, prohibits "evidence 
of a statement which is made other than by a witness while 
testifying at the hearing" for the purposes of proving "the 
truth of the matter stated" unless the proof fits one of 
several enumerated categories. Appellant then names three of 
those categories which supposedly exempt the police report 
from exclusion as hearsay. 
Rule 63 (1) (a) allows testimony of a witness's 
prior statements which are inconsistent with the testimony 
of that witness at the hearing. Prior inconsistent statements 
are admissible both as proof of the matter stated and for 
impeachment purposes. Note, following Rule 63(1), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Appellant's position is that in the police 
report Harris described Hutchison's act as anal intercourse, 
-7-
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while at trial Harris referred to it as fellatio. However, 
the prior statement does not meet the foundation requirement 
of reliability. The record clearly shows that the sixteen 
year old Harris was not, even by trial time, familiar with 
the "legal" or "scientific" terms for the various types of 
sodomy. Furthermore, the boy seemed somewhat reluctant 
to immediately reveal his ignorance: 
Q. [Defense counsel, Mr. Weight] : When 
you were aroused or woke up again you 
testified that you believe the defendant 
was cor.unitting the act of fellatio? 
h. [Scott Harris]: Yes. 
Q. Do you know what fellatio means? 
A. No. 
(Tr.31). That same reluctance to press for a definition of ar. 
unfamiliar term could easily have been present when the 
police officer questioned him as well. 
The trial court responded to the boy's confusion 
by suggesting that defendant counsel "use nonlegal language 
for the witness." He then cautioned Harris: "Be sure you 
understand the questions, young man, before you answer them. 
If you don't understand them, tell me" (Tr. 31). It was, no 
doubt, obvious to the trial court that the boy' s confusion of 
the terms was not evidence that anal intercourse occurred 
nor grounds for impeaching his credibility as a witness, but 
was simply a teenager's unfamiliarity with specific 
vocabulary. When asked to describe in detail the act itself, 
Harris was not at all confused, nor does appellant claim 
-8-
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any inconsistency in that testimony. It is only in 
Harris's use of the labels that appellant finds any 
variation. 
Appellant also contends that Rule 63(13), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, excepts the police report from 
exclusion as hearsay. The rule provides for exception 
of: 
(13) Business Entries and The 
Like. Writings offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions or events to 
prove the facts stated therein, if the 
judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of a business at or about 
the time of the act, condition or event 
recorded, and that the sources of informa-
tion from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation were 
such as to indicate trustworthiness. 
(Emp'.-lasis added.) The investigating police officer and the 
'v:itness \.'ho discovered Harris naked on the lawn described 
nim as being "presumably in shock" (Tr.13), "cold" (Tr. 41) 
2nu unce~ the influence of alcohol (Tr.42). He was lying 
"in smoKe anc fire," burned (Tr.12), beside his smoking 
~elcn~incs, ~ith nothing on but a burned boot (Tr.14). It 
'>:as in ti1ese circumstances that Harris had his first 
conversation with Officer Smith. The second took place 
at the hospital a short time later. These were the 
"sources of information" and the "circumstances" from which 
the report was made. They cannot be expected to be as lucid 
or as consistent as the "trustworthiness" standard implies 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they mus-c be. Indeed, the setting of the extrajudicial 
statement is generally a key indicator of the statement's 
probable trustworthiness. State v. Derryberry, 528 P.2d 
1034, 1037 (Ore. 1974). For example, an out-of-court 
statement by a person who had taken drugs earlier in the 
day has been ruled inadmissible because of the drug's 
effect on the witness's memory and perception. See State v. 
Howard, 12 Wash.App. 158, 529 P. 2d 21, 22 (1974). Undoubtedly, 
the trial court took into account the circumstances and the 
dazed state of the v.·itness when it ruled against the report's 
admission. 
Appellant also relies on Rule 63 (15), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, to justify admission of the report for impeachment 
purposes. That hearsay exception, entitled "Reports and 
Findings of Public Officials," provides for admission of: 
.factual data contained in written 
reports or findings of fact made by a public 
official of the United States or of a state 
or territcrv of the United States, if the 
judge finds.that the making thereof was 
within the scope of the duty of such 
official a~d that it was his duty (a) to 
perforr, the act reported, or (b) to observe 
the act, condition, or event reported, or (c) 
to investigate the facts concerning the act, 
condition or event and to make findings or 
draw conclusions based on such investigation. 
(Emphasis added). Harris's alleged statement in the police 
report does not qualify under this description. First, Harris" 
reply to the Officer's questioning cannot be classed as 
11 factua:I 
I 
-10- I 
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date" or "findings of fact." The officer did not find as a 
matter of fact that Hutchison committed anal intercourse 
on Harris. The reply certainly cannot be classified as 
empirical or tangible evidence or data. It does not fit 
the category of evidence intended by the exception. The 
section further contemplates the reporting of an "act, 
condition or event," performed, observed, or investigated 
by the officer (subsections a, b, and c). However, the 
evidence at issue here is a statement, not an act, condition, 
or event, nor is it a finding about the event. Again, it 
is not the tangible, reliable kind of evidence that would 
meet the requirements of the exemption. If the officer's 
report is to be sufficiently credible to stand as proof of 
the matter asserted, this section requires a close involvement 
by the officer with the event itself. Reporting of a statement 
about the event is a step removed from the evidence allowed 
by Rule 63 (15). 
The value of the police report for impeachment was 
~er :imited. Appellant could have accomplished the same 
result by asking the victim and the officer about the victim's 
confusion of terms. Sufficient foundation to allow cross-
examination about the inconsistency was possible without the 
report. Appellant's counsel failed to lay adequate foundation, 
but such failure does not render rejection of the report as 
error. 
-11-
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Appellant has not objected to the exclusion of the 
police report on the grounds that it qualifies under the 
spontaneous or contemporaneous utterances exception to the 
hearsay rule (See Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence). 
Therefore, that argument is technically not an issue on 
appeal. However, because the hearsay issue is generally 
before this court, and because the point is one that might 
naturally be raised under these facts, respondent will deal 
with it here. 
Rule 63 (4), Utah Rules of Evidence, allows admissior. 
of a statement (a) which the judge finds was made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the 
statement narrates, describes or explains; or (b) which the 
judge finds was made while the declarant was under the stress 
of a nervous excitement caused by such perception. The 
rationale behind the exception is that instinctive or 
spontaneous statements that rise out of events reflect the 
true nature of the situation and the speaker's feelings, 
and thus are presl.L'71ptively truthful. See 29 Arn. Jur. 2d, 
Evidence, § 708. The exception does not apply in this case, 
however, since the requisite spontaneity is lacking. The 
situation is parallel in crucial respect to McGugan v. State, 
167 P. 2d 76 (Okla. 1946), where the court ruled inadmissible 
-12-
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statements made to police officers by the victim of a rape. 
The statements were not part of the res gestae, said the 
court, because the prosecutrix had not volunteered them to 
the first person she had contact with after the crime, and 
because some time had elapsed before she could get to the 
police station. Similarly, the prosecuting witness's con-
tested statement here was not volunteered to Suffern, who 
first discovered him, nor to Officer Smith, but was a response 
to questioning which occurred sometime after Harris was 
discovered and regained consciousness. 
Respondent maintains that the prosecuting witness's 
statements to the police were not, by their nature, of the 
type that generally qualify under the exception. They were 
not instinctual reactions to the criminal act itself, since 
that had occurred some hours before, nor were they uttered in 
2 startlec or excited state. On the contrary, Harris was 
dazed anc subdued. Further, the nature of the disputed terms 
(anal intercourse or fellatio) makes it highly unlikely that 
~ney would be part of the instinctive vocabulary of a 
sixteen year old (see also State v. Wilson, 532 P.2d 825 
(Ore. 1975)). 
c 
THE POLICE REPORT WAS INADMISSIBLE 
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO LAY 
APPROPRIATE FOUNDATION FOR ITS 
ACCEPTANCE. 
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The police report was inadmissible as substantive 
evidence to impeach Harris under any of the hearsay 
exceptions because it lacks inherent reliability; its 
reliability is further questionable because a proper 
foundation was not laid for its admission. It is a well-
established rule of evidence that before a report can be 
received in evidence certain authenticity requirements 
must be met. See State v. Orona, 92 N.M. 450, 589 P. 2d 1041 
(1979); Dolan v. People, 449 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1969); Johnson 
v. State, 253 A. 2d 206 (Del. Supr. 1969); Mathis v. Stricklinc, 
201 Kan. 655, 443 P.2d 673 (1968); McCormick, Law of Evidence 
(1972) 14-19. These requirements include, in addition to 
establishing the time and place of the recording, verification 
by the maker that the report is an accurate reflection of hls 
memory of the event. This verification is usually accornplisnei 
by exhausting the Kitness's memory on the subject--asking 
him to testify first to his independent recollection of the 
incident. See State v. Orona, supra, at 1045; 3 Weinstein's 
Evidence, § 612[01] (1978). Appellant's counsel here failed 
to meet the authentication requirements because he did not ask 
Officer Smith either to testify as to his recollections of the 
interviews with Harris or to refresh his recollection by lookin: 
at the report. Officer Smith identified the document as 
being a copy of the incident report prepared from notes of the 
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conversations between himself and Harris, but appellant's 
counsel went no further than those preliminary identification 
questions before requesting that the repor~ be submitted in 
evidence (Tr. 46-48). What specifically transpired during the 
interviews was not even alluded to; Officer Smith was never 
asked if he could remember the content of the interviews nor 
given an opportunity to testify independently of the 
statements in the report. Appellant's counsel came to the 
point in his questioning where those questions would have been 
appropriate, but failed to ask them. 
Failure to lay proper foundation was not cited by the 
trial court as a reason for excluding the report. However, 
even if, arguendo, the report was excluded for the wrong 
reason, the existence of other valid reasons for its exclusion 
means that the evidence was properly barred. See Shore Line 
Properties, Inc. v. Deer-0-P&ints and Chemicals, Ltd., 24 
.:.riz.J.pp. 331, 538 P. 2d 760 (1975); Foss Lewis & Sons Const. 
Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 
P.2d 539 (1973); Green Ditch ~ater Co. v. Salt Lake City, 
15 Utah 2d 224, 370 P.2d 586 (1964). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING THE POLICE REPORT. 
The trial judge found that the police report was 
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not admissible for impeachment purposes (Tr.49)--to prove 
that a contradictory statement had been made. The court 
noted Harris's uncertainty about nomenclature under 
examination (Tr.31) and specifically found him a credible 
witness, even under heated cross-examination (Tr.77). 
Whatever inconsistency there may have been was not of 
significant relevance or reliability, in the court's judgment, 
to impair the credibility of the prosecuting witness or 
require the admission of questionable evidence. 
This court has consistently held that "the trial 
judge has superior knowledge as to the competency and effect 
which should be given evidence." Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 
Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972). In addition, when the 
trial is to a judge, as here, and not to a jury, decisions 
about the admissibility of evidence are less stringently 
examined, since the judge is making his decisions on both 
the law and the facts. This court has said: 
.when the trial is to the court, 
his rulings on evidence need not be subjected 
to quite such critical scrutiny as when it is 
to a jury, because in arriving at his conclusions 
upon the issues he will include in his 
consideration of them his knowledge and his 
judgment as to the competency, materiality 
and effect of evidence. 
In re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442, 445 
(1965). See also Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 
-16-
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Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966). The presumption is that 
rhe trial judge will be able to distill what is relevant 
from the evidence presented and offered. 
Therefore, unless there is a clear showing that 
the trial judge has abused this discretion, his decisions 
should not be overturned. "This court has held that it will 
not disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial 
court, unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of that 
discretion." State v. Carlson, Nos. 16582, 16583 (Utah, 
July 31, 1981). Since the trial judge has great leeway in 
deciding what the facts are, as presented by the evidence, 
there is no clear showing that he abused his discretion in 
choosing to believe and give weight to certain facts while 
excluding others. See Salt Lake City v. United Park City 
;:ine Cc., 28 Utah 2d 409, 503 P. 2d 850 (1972). 
In order to reverse a verdict based on the 
erroneous exclusio!"'. of evidence, two things must be shown, 
2s descri~ed in Ru:e 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
~ ver~ict or findinc shall not be 
set aside, nor shall the,judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) 
it appears of record that the proponent of 
the evidence either made known the substance 
of the evidence in a form and by a method 
approved by the judge, or indicated the 
substance of the expected evidence by questions 
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indicating the desired answers, and (b) 
the court which passes upon the effect of 
the error or errors is of the opinion that 
the excluded evidence would probably have had 
a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict or finding. ' 
Appellant has failed to satisfy these prerequisites. The 
evidence was not introduced in a form approved by the judge; 
instead, it was classified as hearsay. Nor did appellant 
indicate the substance of the expected evidence by his 
questions; in fact, he neglected to ask the questions 
necessary for a proper foundation for the evidence. Since 
there is no clear showing that there would have been a 
different result if the report had been admitted, as discuss~ 
below, the trial court's discretion should not be overturned. 
POINT III 
IF EXCLUSION OF THE REPORT WAS ERROR, IT 
WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Should this Court find that the trial court's refusal 
to admit the police report was error, such refusal did not 
prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant and thus 
does not justify reversal of the conviction. This Court has 
pointed out on numerous occasions that it "will not reverse 
criminal cases for mere error or irregularity." State v. 
Neal, l Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 756 (1953). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953), states in part: 
-18-
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If error has been committed, it 
shall not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is 
warranted in reversing the judgment. 
Improper reception or rejection of evidence is not grounds 
for reversal if there is sufficient competent evidence 
to sustain the judgment. See Bonine v. Bonine, 367 P.2d 
6 6 4 (Ariz . 1961 ) . 
In this case, appellant has failed to show that 
the result would have been different if the evidence 
has been admitted. The prosecuting witness's testimony is 
not denied or contradicted by appellant. Although appellant 
admitted inviting Harris home with him, he testified that he 
coes not remember \·;hat happened that night (Tr.73,75). The 
;:rosecutins witness's testimony, on the other hand, is 
corroborated by several verified facts: Harris saw 
EJ~chiscn in a dress an~ wig; in court Harris identified 
a dress and wig fo~nd in Hutchison's apartment as looking 
li;,e tic.cse !"le Sa\; Eutchison wearing; Harris testified that 
a;::::e::._la:-_e: pulled Bc.rris's pants down and he ran out of the 
house in the middle of the night; Harris was found naked on 
appellant's lawn at five o'clock a.m. 
Harris's testimony that the sodomy occurred was 
uncontradicted and even verified by circumstantial evidence. 
But even if there was proof that the event occurred as 
;:urportedly recorded in the police report, the act would still 
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constitute sodomy. Under the Utah statute, either unconsented 
anal or oral intercourse is forcible sodomy,: 
(1) A person commits sodomy when he 
engages in any sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another person, regardless of the sex of 
either participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, even if the matter asserted could be proven, its 
exclusion would be harmless error because the act would still 
constitute a necessary element of the crime. 
In State v. Simmons, upon finding that excluded 
hearsay evidence was admissible, the court gave a test for 
determining whether the exclusion was harmless: 
We must review alleged error in 
conformity with 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, and 
may not interfere with a jury verdict, 
unless upon review of the entire record, 
there emerges error of sufficient gravity 
to indicate defendant's rights were 
prejudiced, in a substantial manner. 
There must be a reasonable probability there 
would have been a result more favorable to 
defendant, in the absence of error. 
573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977). The alleged error in this case 
is not of sufficient gravity to indicate that appellant's 
rights were prejudiced. 
The exclusion, if error, would also be harmless 
error because appellant had other ways of attacking Harris's 
credibility. The trial court's ruling only excluded the 
police report; it did not prevent appellant from questioning 
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the witness's consistency and credibility in other ways. 
Appellant might have questioned Harris's knowledge of 
other anatomical terns or homosexual practices, to 
establish that Harris really did have more acquaintance 
with the subject than he seemed to have. But appellant 
did not. The burden was on him, not on the court or the 
state, to pursue all avenues which might discredit the 
witness. Since the police report was not appellant's only 
recourse, its exclusion was not of itself prejudicial and 
any error in excluding it is harmless. Appellant had ample 
opportunity to challenge appellant's prior statement and 
cor,fusion. This was possible without the report and its 
exclusion was therefore harmless. 
The conclusion this Court reached in State v. Urias, 
is full~ apposite here: 
~he :nc.ndate of our statute [U.C.A. § 
/-~2-::_ (1953)], and the policy firmly 
estab:ished in our decisional law, is that 
we do not ~pset the verdict of a jury merely 
because so~e error or irregularity may have 
occurred, bit will do so only if it is 
sone~ti~g s~bstantial and prejudicial in the 
sense t~at there is a reasonable likelihood 
t~at in its absence there would have been 
a different result. 
609 P. 2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). Respondent 
submits that even if the police report had been admitted, the 
discrepancy was so easily explainable and insignificant that 
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the trial judge would not have ruled differently. If 
there was error committed, it had no prejudicial effect 
upon appellant's rights. In short, the judge could easily 
have determined, with or without the police report, that 
the prosecuting witness's testimony was consistent and 
believable. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
VERDICT. 
A 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
PROSECUTING WITNESS'S UN-
CORROBORATED TESTIMONY IS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. 
Appellant's challenge of the sufficiency of the 
evidence is not unusual in a sexual assault case, because 
so much of the proof rests upon the testimony of the victim. 
In response to a similar challenge in State v. Ward, 10 
Vt~~ 2d 3~. 3~7 P.2d 865 (1959), this Court said: 
In regard to t~E ~eneral C!~~rgc that t:1~ 
·~\-iOence does n::.:~ supJ_Jort t!i~ verd.ict, t:ne 
CeZenC.an~ c.rgues thot the con\'iction should 
be scrutinized with great care because it is 
a charge easy to make and bard to defend 
against; particularly so here because impor-
tant parts of the state's case rest entirely 
upon the testimony of the prose cu tr ix. With 
that general proposition we are in accord. 
But it also should be kept in mind that this 
offense is rarely committed in the presence 
of witnesses and often the conviction of the 
guilty could only be had upon the victim's 
testimony. It has often been held that if 
there is nothing inherently contradictory or 
1ncred1ble in her story a conviction may rest 
upon the v1ct1m's testimony alone. 
Id. at 868 (emphasis added). 
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Appellant stresses that testimony by Harris 
"was the only evidence at all presented by the State to 
prove the elements of the crime alleged." Appellant's 
Brief at 18-19. Yet, this court has specifically found 
that fact unpersuasive. In State v. Middelstadt, 579 
P.2d 908 (Utah 1978), the court gave the basis on which 
it must deal with uncorroborated testimony: 
In general, the common law supports the 
contention that a conviction may be sustained 
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the 
victim, and that such evidence is not insub-
stantial simply because the testimony is 
As to the 
it is settled 
that it is 
is insuffi-
conflicting in some respects. 
quality of the testimony given, 
that it must be so improbable 
completely unbelievable before it 
c1ent to u~hold a conviction. We do not find 
case here. 
Consistent witt the Ward and 
there is in this case "nothing 
i:.::~:-·2n~l_:- con:.~c.-~ :..ctcry or incredii.:ile 11 in the victim's 
is testimony II SQ i:;iprobaole that it 
:..~=-~e~:. te~~ t~ s~ppo~t ~arris's accou~t. 
Nor does the issue of consent apply here to 
invalidate Harris's testimony. The pertinent part of 
Utah Code Ann§ 76-5-406 (1977), contains this definition 
of lack of consent: 
-23-
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An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, 
or sexual abuse is without consent of the 
victim under any of the following circumstances: 
(3) The victim has not consented and the 
actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware 
that the act is occurring, or physically 
unable to resist; 
{Emphasis added.) Harris's testimony that he was both 
unconscious and, later, physically unable to resist are 
corroborated by his conduct after the assault: he freed 
himself as soon as he could and fled the house. In his 
intoxicated condition he could not go far, but his 
immediate impulse was to leave. Harris was found a few 
hours later outside, not inside, the house, his condition 
verification of a hasty exit. In State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 
117, 63 P.2d 585, 588 (1937), this Court concluded that the 
trial court "could properly consider the conduct of the 
[victim] towards the defendant after the commission of the 
assault as bearing on whether [he] consented." Hutchison d~! 
not deny that an act of sodomy took place; Harris' s condi tioc 
the next morning is certainly strong evidence that the act'"'! 
not consensual. 
B 
ON APPEAL, EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN 
~HE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO CONVICTION. 
At trial, the finder of fact found appellant guilty 
of forcible sodomy. On appeal, the evidence should be viewed 
in the light most favorable to that verdict. State v. W~' 
10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959); State v. Berchtold, 
I 
I 
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:._1 l~tab 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960). The finder of fact 
was in the best position to observe the facial expressions, 
~annerisms, and tone of voice of the witnesses, and thus 
was in the best position to weigh the evidence. Those 
kinds of judgments are difficult, if not impossible, to 
make on appeal. 
Further, this court has determined that on 
appeal from conviction, the court must assume that the 
trial court believed those aspects of evidence and drew 
inferences that reasonably could be drawn therefrom in a 
lisht favorable to the verdict. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 
7SO (Utah 1977); State v. Gandee, 587 P. 2d 1064 (Utah 1978). 
In other words, the strong presumption is that the trial 
verdict is correct. Appellant, to prevail, has the burden of 
provi~g that the verdict was unreasonable, and this he has 
:aileC t.c Co. 
Appellant, citing as error the trial court's 
refusal to admit the police report as evidence, attempts 
to c~der~ine the prosecutinq witness's credibility. Yet it 
is a well-settled axiom of criminal law in this state that 
the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of 
witnesses. State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. Mills, 
530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 
307 P.2d 212 (1957). In a restatement of the standard of 
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review it would apply to claims of insufficiency such 
as appellant's, this court declared: 
It is the exclusive functioti of the 
jury [fact-finder] to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, and it is not within the 
prerogative of this court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the fact-finder. 
This court should only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that reasonable men could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm, 606 P. 2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, appellant's burden here is to show that the 
evidence was so clearly inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds must have had reasonable doubts that the 
crime was committed. Appellant has not met that burden. 
This court even more emphatically set the standard appella~ 
must meet in State v. Romero, supra: 
This court has set the standard for 
determining sufficiency of evidence to 
require that it be so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds could not reasonably believe defendant 
had committed a crime. Unless there is a 
clear showing of lack of evidence, the [trial 
court] verdict will be ppheld. 
554 P.2d at 219 (emphasis added). 
Respondent submits that in viewing the evidence in 
its entirety, as the trial court did, it is not "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds" 
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could not convict a?pellant. On the contrary, the evidence 
was sufficient and substantial and, therefore, the verdict 
should be upheld. Appellant has not made "a clear showing 
of lack o:: evidence," as this court requires. The only "lack 
of evidence" appellant points to is his question of Harris's 
credibility. However, appellant's objection is without 
foundation on appeal, since judging the credibility of 
witnesses is a trial court r·esponsibility. The trial judge 
specifically found Harris "quite a credible witness under 
heated and extensive cross-examination" (Tr.77). The 
testimony of the passerby who discovered Harris, of the 
examining police of::icer, of the officers who saw appellant 
and Harris at the bus station, of appellant's sister in 
regards tc appellan~'s intoxication of the morning after, 
and the tangib~e evidence at the scene all corroborate the 
details o~ Bar~is' s testimony. Harris's purported confusion 
~it~ ter~inology ::a::..ls far short of rendering his testimony 
"co:nplete::..y un8elie··able," as rec:;uired by this Court in 
[I:t is settled that [the victim's 
uncorroborated testimony] must be so 
improbable that it is completely unbelievable 
before it is insufficient to uphold a conviction. 
597 P.2d at 911 (emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly excluded from evidence a 
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police report on the basis that it was hearsay and did not 
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. If, arguendo, 
error was committed, it was harmless error ~hich did not 
affect appellant's substantive rights. 
A victim's uncorroborated testimony is sufficient 
to convict in a sexual abuse case, particularly where, as 
here, circumstances and other testimony support the victim's 
account. The trial court, as the exclusive judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the 
evidence, determined in this case that adequate evidence 
was present to sustain a verdict of guilt; and on review, 
the evidence meets the standard of being adequately conclusiw 
and probable so that reasonable minds could and did reasonably 
believe that appellant committed the crime. 
On the basis of the above authority and the evidence 
against appellant presented at trial, respondent prays that 
the verdict and sentence be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Mr. Gary H. Weight, Attorney for Appellant, 
43 East 200 North, P. O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84601, this 
7 day of October, 1981. 
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